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Abstract The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF)
which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of
CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper
generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple
types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and
interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis
(Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used
by applied researchers.
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JEL Classification C70 · D72 · D74
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades models of contest have been used to study rent seeking
(Nitzan 1994) and conflict (Skaperdas and Garfinkel 2006) by political economists,
reward structure in firms (Rosen 1986) by labor economists, electoral competition
(Snyder 1989) and design of optimal voluntary contribution mechanisms by public
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economists (Kolmar and Wagener 2005), and individual and team sports (Szymanzki
2003) by sports economists. A contest is modeled as a non-cooperative game between
multiple agents. Agents make irreversible investments, which can be effort, money, or
any other valuable resource depending on the context, to increase their probability of
winning the contest and obtaining a private prize.
The key element of all models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which
specifies the winning probabilities of the contestants. Skaperdas (1996) axiomatizes
several classes of CSFs in which each agent has a single type of investment (for exam-
ple, effort). Clark and Riis (1998) extend it by allowing contestants to differ in their
contest-relevant personal characteristics.1 We aim to generalize the axiomatization of
Skaperdas (1996) to the case where agents can have multiple types of investments.
We think of the various actual investments by an agent as inputs that he combines us-
ing his2 technology to produce effective investments. The effective investments then
determine the winning probabilities. In our framework one can interpret the contest-
relevant personal characteristics of a contestant as yet another type of input (which
is fixed, and not a choice variable for the contestant). The primary contribution of
our paper is thus to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of
Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) by allowing multiple types of investments
for each contestant. Consequently, several seemingly ad hoc CSFs that have been used
by applied researchers arise as special cases of the family of CSFs axiomatized in this
paper.3
Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the four basic axioms of probability, con-
sistency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and marginal effects. Section 3 first
axiomatizes the class of CSFs satisfying the four basic axioms and homogeneity of
order zero with respect to each investment of each contestant, and then clarifies the
impact of the axiom of anonymity. Section 4 concludes. The appendix contains all the
proofs.
2 The axioms
Let N represent the finite set of contestants {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , n}. We shall denote the
vector of investments by contestant-i as zi ∈ RL+. Some of the L types of invest-
ments may not be a choice variable for a contestant during the contest. For example,
in a sporting contest the personal talents and abilities of players can be treated as
fixed investments (not subject to choice during the contest) that influence the winning
probabilities. The probability that contestant-i wins the contest will be denoted as
pi (z) = pi (z1, z2, . . . , zi , . . . , zn), ∀i ∈ N ,
1 They drop the axiom of anonymity which requires agents with equal investments to have equal winning
probabilities.
2 We will later distinguish between unmediated and mediated contests depending upon whether contestants
possess their own technology to produce effective investments, or it is determined by the contest adminis-
trator.
3 We achieve this without introducing any new axioms. We simply state the axioms of Skaperdas (1996)
for the case where each contestant can have multiple types of investments.
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where each pi (z) ∈ [0, 1] for all z ∈ RL N+ , and pi (z) is strictly positive if each
investment by contestant-i is strictly greater than zero. The function pi (z) is the CSF.
We shall refer to the contest involving all the N agents as the global contest, and any
contest involving agents in M ⊆ N as a sub-contest.4 pMi (z) will henceforth be used
to denote the winning probabilities of agents involved in the sub-contest. Similarly,
the vector zM ∈ RL M+ will be used to represent the investment by agents in M ⊆ N .
For any given z ∈ RL N+ , the four axioms introduced by Skaperdas (1996) are
[A1] Probability ∑i∈N pi (z) = 1.




, ∀i ∈ M, and ∀M ⊆ N .
[A3] IIAs pMi (z)= pMi (zM ), ∀ i ∈ M, and ∀M ⊆ N , where z =(zM , zN\M ).
[A4] Marginal effects pi (z˜i , z−i ) > pi (zi , z−i ) if z˜i > zi , ∀ i ∈ N .
The axiom of probability requires the winning probabilities to sum to unity. For
a given vector of investments z ∈ RL N+ , consider the sub-contest among agents in
M ⊆ N . Consistency requires the probability that i ∈ M wins this sub-contest (pMi (z))
to be the same as the probability that i would have won the global contest among all
the N agents, given that one of the agents in M wins it. Consistency does not, however,
rule out the possibility that the winning probability of an agent in M might depend
on the investments of agents outside M . The axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIAs) is introduced to eliminate this possibility. The axiom of marginal
effects prescribes that the winning probability of a contestant should be increasing in
each of his investments.
Theorem 1 The axioms A1–A4 are satisfied if and only if
pi (z) = fi (zi )∑
k∈N fk(zk)
, ∀ z ∈ RL N+ , ∀i ∈ N , (1)
where each fi (·) is increasing in each of its arguments.
Proof In the Appendix.
Theorem 1 essentially says that the winning probability of each agent can be expressed
using n functions, where the function corresponding to contestant-i depends only on
his own vector of investments, zi ∈ RL+. We interpret the value of fi (zi ) as the level of
effective investment by contestant-i . The effective investment of contestant-i is like
an output determined by the levels of the L inputs (z1i , z2i , . . . , zLi ), and the technology
of combining these inputs ( fi (·)). The technology of producing effective investments
can differ across agents, as reflected by the subscript i , since we have not imposed
the axiom of anonymity. The ratio of winning probabilities of any two agents is thus
equal to the ratio of their effective investments.
4 Suppose we somehow know that the winner of the contest belongs to the set M which is a subset of N .
The winning probabilities of the contestants in M can be updated given this new information. The concept
of a sub-contest is used to propose some reasonable conditions regarding (a) how the updated probability
of any contestant in the winning set M should be related to initial probabilities, and (b) what should the
updated probabilities (not) depend upon.
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3 Axiomatization
Skaperdas (1996) considers contests where each agent can make only one type of
investment and proves that a CSF satisfies the axioms of probability, consistency,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, marginal effects, homogeneity of order zero
with respect to investments, and anonymity if and only if it is the anonymous Tullock-
CSF given by




, ∀x ∈ RN+ , ∀i ∈ N , (2)
where θ is a strictly positive constant and xi ∈ R+ is the investment by contestant-i .
Clark and Riis (1998) argue that the anonymity axiom is inappropriate in several
contests as the winning probabilities may depend not only on the investments but also
on the “personal characteristics” of the contestants. They go on to prove that a CSF
satisfies the axioms of probability, IIAcr,5 marginal effects, and homogeneity with
respect to investments if and only if it is the non-anonymous Tullock-CSF given by




, ∀x ∈ RN+ , ∀i ∈ N , (3)
where αi represents the contest-relevant personal characteristics of contestant-i . Note
that Clark and Riis treat the personal characteristics of contestants as exogenous
parameters.
3.1 Homogeneity
We now provide an axiomatization for the CSFs that can be used to analyze contests in
which agents can have multiple types of investments using the four axioms discussed
in the previous section, and the following axiom.
[A5] Homogeneity pi (λz) = pi (z), ∀ λ > 0, ∀ z ∈ RL N+ , ∀ i ∈ N .
Homogeneity requires that the winning probabilities should remain unchanged if each
type of investment of all the contestants changes by the same multiplicative factor.
The main result of the paper follows.
Theorem 2 The axioms A1–A5 are satisfied if and only if
pi (z) = fi (zi )∑
k∈N fk(zk)
, ∀ z ∈ RL N+ , ∀ i ∈ N , (4)
5 Clark and Riis (1998) propose to combine consistency and IIAs into IIAcr. However, IIAcr is satisfied
by only those CSFs that lead to a winning probability of zero for a contestant who invests zero. It can be
easily verified that the Logit-CSF satisfies consistency and IIAs, but not IIAcr.
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where each fi (·) is a homogenous function of the same degree µ > 0, and increasing
in each of its arguments.
Proof In the Appendix.
Imposing homogeneity in addition to the four basic axioms leads to a family of CSFs
characterized by the fact that the production function of each contestant is a homoge-
nous function. Moreover, the degree of homogeneity of these production functions
is the same for all contestants. Obviously, it allows the specific form of production
functions to vary across contestants.
We now present some examples of CSFs that belong to the family axiomatized
in Theorem 2. In all the following examples, without loss of generality, we shall
restrict ourselves to the case with only two types of investments. We shall denote the
investment vector of contestant-i by zi = (xi , yi ). The overall investment vector will
be denoted by z = (x, y).
Example 1 fi (xi , yi ) = (θi · xi + yi ), where θi > 0, for all i ∈ N .
This example represents the case where each agent has a linear production function
for effective investment, but the marginal rate of technical substitution among the two
investments varies across the contestants. We will obtain
pi (x, y) = (θi · xi + yi )∑
k∈N (θk · xk + yk)
, ∀ i ∈ N . (5)
The nature of the contest might suggest that one of the investments should be treated
as fixed for all contestants (say, yi = yi , ∀i ∈ N ) since it is not subject to choice
during the contest. Then
pi (x) = (αi + θi · xi )∑
k∈N (αk + θk · xk)
, ∀ i ∈ N , (6)
where αi = yi for all i ∈ N . This is precisely the CSF used by Nti (2004). If we
further assume that each contestant has the same level of the fixed investment, i.e., if
yi = α for each i ∈ N , then
pi (x) = (α + θi · xi )∑
k∈N (α + θk · xk)
, ∀ i ∈ N , (7)
which is the CSF used by Kolmar and Wagener (2005).
Example 2 fi (xi , yi ) = (xθii · yηii ), where θi > 0, ηi > 0, and θi + ηi = µ, for all
i ∈ N .
With this Cobb–Douglas production function, the CSF becomes
pi (x, y) = (x
θi




k · yηkk )
, ∀i ∈ N . (8)
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If yi = yi for all i ∈ N , then




k∈N (αk · xθkk )
, ∀ i ∈ N , (9)
where αi = (yi )ηi for all i ∈ N . This CSF has been used by Cornes and Hartley
(2005).
3.2 Anonymity
The CSF in Eq. (9) is not the non-anonymous Tullock-CSF axiomatized by Clark
and Riis (1998) since θi , the exponent of the choice variable xi , can differ across
contestants. It reflects the idea that different agents can possess different technologies
for converting their actual investments into effective investments. Wars, elections, rent
seeking, and sporting contests are best modeled by assuming that each agent possesses
his own technology. We term such contests as unmediated contests. On the other
hand, mediated contests are those wherein the technology of converting agents’ actual
investments into effective investments is determined by the contest administrator. The
administrator may or may not use the same technology across contestants. We have
introduced this distinction between mediated and unmediated contests to point out that
the CSFs satisfying the following axiom of anonymity are better suited for analyzing
mediated contests.
[A6] Anonymity pi (z) = p j (z) if zi = z j , where i = j, and i, j ∈ N .
It can be easily verified that anonymity imposes the restriction that fi (·) = f j (·) for
all i, j ∈ N . Thus, a CSF satisfies axioms A1–A6 if and only if
pi (z) = f (zi )∑
k∈N f (zk)
, ∀ z ∈ RL N+ , ∀ i ∈ N , (10)
where f (·) is increasing in each of its arguments. Recall that Clark and Riis (1998) drop
the axiom of anonymity (with respect to the variable investment) to allow for the pos-
sibility that contestants with the same level of investment can have different winning
probabilities as they can have different levels of contest-relevant personal characteris-
tics. We would like to stress that since we interpret personal characteristics as a type of
investment we do not need to drop the axiom of anonymity. Our framework thus helps
clarify that imposing anonymity is actually equivalent to assuming that the technology
of producing effective investments is same across all the contestants. We now illustrate
the impact of anonymity by reconsidering the two examples presented above.
Example 1′ f (xi , yi ) = (θ · xi + yi ) for all i ∈ N , where θ > 0.
The CSF will be given by
pi (x, y) = (θ · xi + yi )∑
k∈N (θ · xk + yk)
, ∀ i ∈ N . (11)
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If yi = yi for all i ∈ N , then
pi (x) = (αi + xi )∑
k∈N (αk + xk)
, ∀ i ∈ N , (12)
where αi = θ−1 yi for all i ∈ N . Following Corchon (2000), one can interpret αi as
the prior winning probability of contestant-i . If each contestant has the same level of
the fixed investment, i.e., if yi = c for each i ∈ N , then the above CSF becomes
pi (x) = (α + xi )∑
k∈N (α + xk)
, ∀ i ∈ N , (13)
where the scalar α = θ−1c for all i ∈ N .6
Example 2′ f (xi , yi ) = (xθi · yηi ), for all i ∈ N , where θ > 0, η > 0, and θ + η = µ.
The CSF will be given by
pi (x, y) = (x
θ
i · yηi )∑
k∈N (xθk · yηk )
, ∀ i ∈ N . (14)
If yi = yi for all i ∈ N , then
pi (x) = (αi · x
θ
i )∑
k∈N (αk · xθk )
, ∀ i ∈ N , (15)
where αi = (yi )η for all i ∈ N . This is the non-anonymous Tullock-CSF axiomatized
by Clark and Riis (1998). The anonymous Tullock-CSF axiomatized by Skaperdas
(1996) is obtained if we assume that the level of the fixed investment is the same for
all contestants.
4 Conclusion
We consider contests in which each contestant can have multiple types of invest-
ments, some of which may be fixed. We distinguish between two types of contests—
unmediated and mediated contests. In an unmediated contest each contestant uses his
own technology (or, production function) to combine his actual investments and pro-
duce his effective investment; in a mediated contest the contest administrator chooses
the technology for each contestant. The effective investments of all the contestants
then determine the winning probabilities in both types of contests. We axiomatize
6 Amegashie (2006) uses the CSF given in Eq. (13) to model an unmediated contest (rent seeking) and
interprets α as pure luck since each agent would be equally likely to win the contest if each xi is zero. It
is not feasible to increase α for only one contestant while holding it fixed for the remaining contestants
if α is interpreted as “pure” luck. We interpret this CSF as arising from a situation in which αi can vary
independently of α j , for any i, j ∈ N , but αi happens to be the same for all i ∈ N .
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the family of CSFs satisfying homogeneity of order zero with respect to each type
of investment of each contestant and some other basic axioms. The resulting family
of CSFs is characterized by a homogeneous production function for each contestant,
with the degree of homogeneity being the same for all contestants. We also clarify that
the axiom of anonymity restricts the production function of effective investments to
be identical for all contestants—an axiom that seems better suited to obtain CSFs in
order to analyze mediated rather than unmediated contests.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1 This theorem is simply an extension of Theorem 1 in Skaperdas
(1996) to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. Consis-













Let pNi (z) = [i]N represent the probability that contestant-i wins the global contest
among all the N contestants. Similarly, let pMi (z) = pMi (zM ) = [i]M represent the
probability that contestant-i wins the sub-contest among M ⊆ N contestants. For the
sub-contest between contestants in M ,
∑
i∈M
[i]M = 1. (17)








[ j]M = 1. (18)
Consider the two player contests in which one player is always contestant- j . For such





1 − [i]{i, j}




1 − [k]{k, j} . (19)
Using the equalities in Eq. (19), Eq. (18) becomes
[i]M
1 − [i]M ·





1 − [k]{k, j} = 1. (20)
Let the investment vector of contestant- j be fixed at z0. It follows from IIAS that we
can define [i]{i, j}
1 − [i]{i, j} = fi (zi ; z0) = fi (zi ), ∀ i ∈ M. (21)
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Equation (20) can now be written as
[i]M
1 − [i]M ·
1
fi (zi ) ·
k∈M∑
k =i
fk(zk) = 1. (22)
Rearranging the above equation we obtain




, ∀ i ∈ M,∀M ⊆ N , (23)
which is the form given in Eq. (1). Finally, let z˜ = (z˜i , z˜−i ) with z˜i > zi , but z˜−i = z−i .
The axiom of marginal effects requires that





= pi (z˜) (24)
Rearranging the above equations gives
fi (z˜i ) > fi (zi ). (25)
Hence, each fi (·) must be an increasing function of each of its arguments. unionsq.





, ∀ i ∈ N . (26)
We need to show that if pi (λz) = pi (z) for all λ > 0, then
fi (λzi )
fi (zi ) = λ
µ, for all λ > 0, for all i ∈ N ,
where µ is some strictly positive real number and is identical for each i ∈ N . Note
that homogeneity implies
pi (λz) = fi (λzi )∑
k∈N fk(λzk)
= fi (zi )∑
k∈N fk(zk)
= pi (z). (27)
The equalities above hold for all i ∈ N . Thus
fi (λzi )
fi (zi ) =
f j (λz j )




, ∀i, j ∈ N . (28)
Since the last term in the above equality is the same for all i ∈ N , we can conclude that
fi (λzi )
fi (zi ) depends on λ but not on zi . Hence, if the vector of investments by contestant-i
123
148 B. K. Rai, R. Sarin
were to be z˜i ∈ RL+, we would have
fi (λzi )
fi (zi ) =
fi (λz˜i )
fi (z˜i ) , for all λ > 0, for all i ∈ N . (29)
The above equation can be rewritten as
fi (λzi )
fi (λz˜i ) =
fi (zi )
fi (z˜i ) , for all λ > 0, for all i ∈ N . (30)
Let us define
gwi (γ ) = fi (γw, γ ), (31)
where γ ∈ R+ and w ∈ RL−1+ .
For any strictly positive real numbers α and β
gwi (αβ)
gwi (α)
= fi (αβw, αβ)fi (αw, α) . (32)
Using Eq. (30), the above equation (by treating α as λ, and then substituting α = 1)
gives
fi (αβw, αβ)
fi (αw, α) =
fi (βw, β)
















Equation (34) is one of Cauchy’s fundamental functional equations (Aczel 1966)
whose standard solution is given by
gwi (α) = gwi (1) · αhi (w) = fi (w, 1) · αhi (w), (35)
where hi (·) is some function of w. Let αw = z−li = (z1i , . . . , zl−1i , zl+1i , . . . , zLi ) and




















which in turn gives
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The above equation implies
fi (λzi )








( fi (λzi )
fi (zi )
)





must be the same constant, say, µ, for each i ∈ N . Moreover, µ
must be a strictly positive real number for the axiom of marginal effects to be satisfied.
unionsq
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